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Abstract 
This paper examines the stock market reaction to research and development 
(R&D) announcements made by listed UK companies.   We find R&D projects on 
average to be associated with significant positive abnormal returns.  However, the 
level of these abnormal returns varies significantly with the ownership structure of 
the firm.  In particular, we find the level of abnormal returns to be significantly 
lower for companies with large institutional investors.  This negative relationship 
may be associated with short-term pressures on the performance of institutional 
investors. 
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R&D Project Announcements 
and the Impact of Ownership Structure  
 
1. Introduction 
It has long been suggested that financial markets are inherently short-termist and 
as such many valuable investment opportunities are rejected. In this paper, we 
examine the influence of institutional and insider ownership on the stock market 
reaction to corporate investment announcements. We use the specific case of 
company research and development (R&D) announcements since this type of 
investment would not be expected to produce cash flows in the short-term. The 
sample is made up of 54 announcements from the Stock Exchange Regulatory 
News Service registered between September 1991 and September 1996.  
 
The R&D announcements are collected in accordance with the following 
definition:  R&D projects involve the commitment of resources to “work directed 
towards the innovation, introduction and improvement of products and processes” 
(Oxford Dictionary of Current English). Such projects have very little certainty 
about where and when the returns will come and consequently a large proportion 
of the value of an R&D project is expected to be realised in the long-term. 
 
We find R&D projects on average to be associated with significant positive 
abnormal returns of 1.0%.  However, we also uncover a significant negative 
relationship between the level of abnormal returns and institutional ownership, 
suggesting such investors view R&D projects negatively. 
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 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We first consider the issue of 
short-termism and previous empirical literature on R&D announcements in section 
2. In section 3 we examine abnormal returns for the set of R&D announcements. 
This is followed in section 4 by a cross-sectional analysis of the market reaction to 
R&D announcements with a set of ownership-related variables and market 
capitalisation is conducted.  Our conclusions are contained in the final section. 
 
2. Literature review 
Critics of the principal-agent model of corporate governance argue that long-term 
investments are undervalued by stock markets, which leads to a failure to invest in 
profitable long-term projects (Charkham, 1994). Keasey et al. (1997) comment 
that the Myopic Market Model “contends that a goal such as shareholder welfare is 
not synonymous with share price maximisation because the market systematically 
undervalues certain long-term expenditures – particularly capital investment and 
R&D spending” (Keasey et al., 1997, p5). The main result of this is that managers 
are forced by the market into an excessive preoccupation with the short-term share 
price and short-term earnings in order to avoid the risk of hostile take-overs. 
 
Ball (1991) and Keasey et al. (1997) note that managerial concentration on short-
term performance in the UK may be primarily a result of the excessive use of 
performance-related pay and share option schemes. One problem of these schemes 
being that ill-informed behaviour by markets could reward poor management or 
penalise good management (Demirag et al., 1994). 
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A further issue is that of institutional dominance of the UK market (Short and 
Keasey, 1997). Firstly, significant institutional shareholdings in companies may 
impose demands on management due to the short-term and earnings-related nature 
of institutional target setting. Secondly, financial markets and the market for 
corporate control, through the threat of the sale of shares and/or a takeover, impose 
a pressure on managers to maintain the stock price and dividends in the short-term 
(Charkham, 1994). 
 
Studies of the relationship between ownership structure and corporate value have 
concentrated on firm value in general rather than on market reactions to new 
information. Berle and Means (1932) suggest an inverse relationship between 
diffuse shareholdings and corporate performance, although this view is 
contradicted by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), who argue 
that there should be no systematic relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance. 
 
The influence of insider ownership on corporate value has been examined by a 
limited number of previous studies.  A number of US studies have identified 
positive relationships between the proportion of companies owned by large 
shareholders and the market value of the firm (e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1990, 
Brickley et al., 1988).  However, the evidence with regard to inside ownership is 
mixed.  Whilst Demsetz and Lehn (1985) fail to identify a linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance, the later studies by Morck 
et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) identify a non-linear relationship, 
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with a negative impact of high levels of managerial ownership on corporate value.  
This is attributed to an entrenchment effect. 
 
There are a number of papers which identify the market response to R&D 
expenditures (Woolridge and Snow, 1990, Chan et al., 1990, Sougiannis, 1994, 
Green et al., 1996, and Chan et al., 1999). These studies report little in the way of 
an ‘allergic’ reaction by share prices to R&D spending.  The  general conclusion of 
these papers is that a positive response to R&D expenditures is to be expected, 
with small but significant abnormal  returns, although this may vary depending on 
firm size, industry sector or the level of technology. 
 
3. Data characteristics and average abnormal returns 
The set of R&D announcements was obtained from the Financial Times Extel 
Database which includes all official announcements made by UK listed companies 
through the Stock Exchange Regulatory News Service for announcements that 
took place between September 1991 and September 1996.   The category of R&D 
announcements included 54 announcements of R&D projects1. Announcements 
were only included if R&D was the primary stated purpose of the project2. Stock 
and market-index (the FT All-Share index3) returns data were obtained from 
Datastream.  We report abnormal returns calculated using the market-adjusted 
returns method, although our results are robust to various model specifications4.  
Insert table 1 here 
 
Table 1 indicates abnormal returns of 1.0% upon the announcement of R&D 
projects, which is significant at the 99% level.  (While somewhat lower, the 
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median abnormal returns of 0.4% are still highly significant).  The average 
abnormal return we obtain for the UK is comparable with the 1.13% observed by 
Woolridge and Snow (1990) and 0.85% found by Chan et al. (1990) for R&D 
project announcements in the US.  
 
4. Corporate ownership and R&D project abnormal returns 
In order to examine the influence of institutional and insider ownership on market 
responses to R&D announcements, data was collected from Crawford’s Directory 
of City Connections and the Stock Exchange Yearbook regarding the proportion of 
company stock held by board members and their families (BFA) and the 
proportion of common stock held by substantial institutional shareholders. 
Institutional owners who owned more than 5% of the common stock of the 
company were identified from Crawford’s Directory. Clearly it is difficult to 
collect data regarding institutional ownership since levels of ownership are 
constantly changing. Furthermore, small holdings are difficult to identify. 
Crawford’s Directory of City Connections contains data for the previous year on 
any substantial shareholders owning over 5% of the common stock of the 
company. Owners were considered to be institutional owners if they were an 
insurance or pension fund, an investment company and an investment, merchant or 
retail bank. 
 
We regress the abnormal returns on the BFA variable and two dummy variables 
representing levels of institutional ownership. The BFA variable is a continuous 
variable representing the percentage of the company’s shares owned by the board 
of directors, families of board members or associates of members of the board. Our 
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data contained 33 cases where a figure for BFA was given in Crawford’s 
Directory. The BFA data was quite widely dispersed for the sample, with a mean 
of 20.5% of the company and a standard deviation of 12.9%. We also use two 
dummy variables to represent the level of institutional shareholdings. The first 
dummy, which we describe as institutional ownership (IO), takes a value of 1 
wherever a company has at least one institutional shareholder owning more than 
5% of the market capitalisation (33 out of 51 cases entered into the regression). 
The second dummy representing higher levels of institutional ownership (HI) takes 
a value of 1 wherever the company has at least 15% of their stock owned by three 
or less institutional shareholders (21/51). 
 
The regression models are shown in table 2. The coefficients for the ownership 
variables are consistently negative throughout the regression analysis. The 
regression coefficients in model 2 indicate that having a single large institutional 
shareholder alone is enough to impact on the level of abnormal returns. The 
institutional ownership variable which represents firms with at least one 
institutional shareholder of over 5% (IO) is significant in the simple regression at 
the 5% significance level. When included with the HI variable, the IO variable 
loses its significance. 
 
Insert table 2 here
 
The negative correlation between institutional ownership and the level of abnormal 
returns remains strong for companies in which the proportion of ownership by 
institutions is greater than 15%. The coefficient for the HI variable is significant at 
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the 5% level in model 3. The explanatory power of the models presented is low, 
but perhaps most significantly the simple regression model containing only the HI 
variable has an adjusted R2 of 9.1%. In all the models in which the HI dummy is 
included the regression coefficient is negative, implying that the abnormal return is 
reduced when a company has at least 15% of its stock held by institutions.  
 
The relationship between BFA and abnormal returns is negative and marginally 
significant in a simple regression, although the coefficient is small. A negative 
effect might be expected if the proposition of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) is accepted which states that as the level of insider ownership 
increases, the level of managerial entrenchment leads to agency costs. However, in 
the models presented the BFA variable is only significant at the 10% level.  In 
addition, the BFA coefficient is approximately zero and loses its significance when 
HI is also included in the regression.  It is therefore not clear that any relationship 
exists between the proportion of company stock owned by the Board, Family and 
Associates and market-adjusted returns. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the stock market valuation of R&D announcements with 
reference to the effect of institutional and insider ownership. We find that 
information regarding R&D projects contains modest new information about the 
company’s future earnings which is impounded into the share price on day t. The 
market-adjusted returns model exhibits an average abnormal return of 1.0%. 
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Various reasons have been put forward in the literature as to why markets may 
undervalue R&D projects. We argue that some market participants may not be 
satisfied with the long-term nature of R&D investment and would prefer to see a 
faster return on their investment. This may particularly apply to institutional 
investors, whose performance is subject to short-term pressures.  This, combined 
with the high levels of share holdings by such investors, suggest the possibility of 
the UK stock market, at least to some extent, being short-termist. 
 
The market-adjusted returns were regressed against variables representing inside 
and institutional ownership. The level of insider ownership was not demonstrated 
to influence the level of abnormal return.  However, variables controlling for high 
levels of institutional ownership were found to be significantly and negatively 
related to abnormal returns, supporting the view that the UK stock market has 
some short-termist characteristics and that the market response to R&D 
announcements is dependent on the proportion of the companies stock held by 
institutional investors.  
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Table 1 
Market-adjusted returns for R&D project announcements 
 
N Mean Std. Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
R&D 51 0.010*** 0.027 0.004*** -0.034 0.120 
       
The table contains market-adjusted abnormal returns on day t for R&D project announcements in 
the UK. The model is specified as AR=Ri – Rm, where Ri refers to the return on the share and Rm to 
the return on the FTSE All Share stock market index.  *** indicates a significant t-test (mean) and 
Wilcoxon test (median) at the 99% level. 
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Table 2 
Regressions of abnormal returns 
Model C BFA IO HI N Adj R2 F 
1 0.017 -0.001   33 0.065 3.241 
 (0.052) (0.082)     (0.082) 
 
2 0.020  -0.016  51 0.059 4.156 
 (0.002)  (0.047)    (0.047) 
 
3 0.017   -0.018 51 0.091 6.022 
 (0.001)   (0.018)   (0.180) 
 
4 0.017 0.000  -0.005 33 0.040 1.663 
 (0.051) (0.322)  (0.682)   (0.207) 
 
5 0.020  -0.007 -0.014 51 0.082 3.229 
 (0.002)  (0.484) (0.145)   (0.048) 
This table represents the results obtained from regressing event day market-adjusted returns on a 
dummy variable representing companies which have at least one institutional owner with a holding 
of over 5% (IO), a dummy variable representing a share of at least 15% held by 3 or less 
institutional shareholders (HI), and the shareholding held by board members, their families and 
associates (BFA).  N rfers to sample size.  Data on BFA was not available for al companies, 
resulting in a reduced sample for regressions including this variable. The significance of the White 
heteroscedasticity consistent t-test of each variable is given underneath in parentheses. F indicates 
the F-statistic. The significance of F is given under the F-statistic in parentheses. No 
autocorrelation was detected for any of the models presented. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Three large positive outliers are excluded from the empirical results. 
2 The sample of research and development announcements included a variety of different types of 
commitment of corporate resources including research collaborations, development of new 
production technology, development of new products and services, exploration and development, 
including development of natural resource discoveries, purchase of exploration property and new 
pharmaceutical developments. Most of the announcements were made by either pharmaceutical or 
oil and gas producers. In each case approval or permission may be required before a project can be 
undertaken. Where shareholders approval is required, the announcement date is the date of first 
announcement prior to approval. 
3 The use of alternative market indices was examined but had a minimal impact since abnormal 
returns were calculated on a daily basis (Strong, 1992, Brown and Warner, 1985). 
4 The results of the market-adjusted returns method were compared with the results of several other 
models including the market model using a beta calculated by making trade-to-trade adjustments. 
This method was not reported due to the large amount of data which is lost due to the limited 
observations available to estimate alphas and betas. There was no significant difference between 
the results of the various models except in cases where alphas and betas were estimated from very 
few observations. Abnormal returns and significance tests calculated using the market model, a 
trade-to-trade adjusted market model and a trade-to-trade adjusted index model are available on 
request from the author. 
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